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tional.2 0 With this in mind, it does not seem unreasonable to con-
clude that, if the special interest groups secure the enactment of
"fair trade" legislation, the court must give considerable weight to
the legislative decision as to what is in the best interest of the public.
The fact that the greatest theoretical benefit from these laws runs
to the small, local businessman, 21 of whom there are many, cer-
tainly would lend plausibility to such a decision on the part of the
legislature.
To summarize, it would appear that the principal case did not
conclusively decide the future status of "fair trade" in Virginia;
that enactment of replacement legislation is quite possible and
that, if enacted, there is only a prospect that the courts will find it





NUNC PRO TUNC ORDERS IN VIRGINIA
What began in England over six-hundred years ago ' as a
simple correction of a one-letter or one syllable error, judgment
nunc pro tunc, has evolved into a modern-day tool of unforseen pos-
sibility of both justice and injustice. Virginia, by its decision in
Council v. Commonwealth 2 has joined the states who are firmly
committed to the course of adding to the tangled mass of progeny
the rule has begotten since its inception in the days of Edward III.
20 Almond v. Gilmer, 188 Va. 822, 51 S.E.2d 272 (1949); City of Newport
News v. Elizabeth City County, 189 Va. 825, 55 S.E.2d 56 (1949);
Sanitation Comm. v. Craft, 196 Va. 1140, 87 S.E.2d 153 (1955).
21 Where effective the agreements fix the resale price at a level at which the
smaller, less efficient seller can make a comfortable profit and, at the
same time, the efficient, large volume seller is precluded from gaining
a competitive advantage by reducing his price.
22 "Equality and rights of men.-That men are by nature equally free and
independent and have certain inherent rights, of which, when they
enter into a state of society, they cannot by any compact deprive or
divest their posterity, namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with
the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and ob-
taining happiness and safety."
1 14 Edw. III, Chap. 6.
2 198 Va. 288, 94 S.E.2d 245 (1956).
The philosophy of judgments nunc pro tune crystallized early
in the Commonwealth of Virginia and has been repeated verbatim
for over a hundred years although no two cases extant are exactly
alike in subject matter. With the instant case the court reassessed
its stand and decided, but not without dissent, to abandon its old
common law minority rule8 and to embark upon the majority and
federal rule.4 Not only did the court revolutionize its stand, but it
adopted the majority rule in its most liberal form.'
Virginia's first cited case 6 on the matter dates back to 1795,
although it was nearly a century later that her first case7 of real im-
portance on the subject arose. By 1919, however, the court's philos-
ophy had reached a definite crystallization point, and, until the in-
stant case arose, Cox v. Hagan" was the leading case of the state.9
The minority rule which was formerly considered the common
law and Virginia rule stated that a nunc pro tunc order cannot be
entered in the absence of something in the record to show that the
order should be made."°
But in Council v. Commonwealth the court states:
Irrespective of our holdings we feel that in the furtherance
of the administration of justice we should now adopt the
majority rule as the law of this jurisdiction.1
The court then held in a five-two decision that an inadvertent
omission of the name of the twelfth juror from an order of convic-
tion for rape could be corrected by a nunc pro tunc order, thus
affirming the trial court. Said order was based upon a clerk's per-
sonal unofficial minute book which listed all twelve jurors whereas
the record listed only eleven. The correction was made more than
four years after the original judgment.' 2
3 The classification referred to is that of the Virginia court.
' Ibid.
5 This means that competent oral evidence would be admissible.
6 Gordon v. Fraizer, 2 Wash. 130, 10 A.L.R. at 534 (1795).
7 Shadrack's Adm'r. v. Woolfolk & Als., 32 Gratt. 707 (1880).
s 125 Va. 656, 100 S.E. 666 (1919).
9 Freeman, Judgments, Vol. 1 (5th ed.) at 672.
20 People v. Rosenwald, 266 Ill. 548 at 554, 107 N.E. 854 at 856 (1915).
11 198 Va. at 292, 94 S.E.2d at 248.
12 In one case a nunac pro tunc order was successfully used fifty-five years
after judgment. Rogers v. Bigstaff's Exr., 176 Ky. 413, 195 S.W. 777
(1917).
Actually, the rules on the use of nunc pro tunc orders are not
as simple, nor as clear-cut as one might think from reading the un-
usually well-documented case of Council v. Commonwealth. A
rough classification is permissible as a tool of understanding, but
in actual practice the rules seem to splinter into innumerable ram-
ifications. There is literally a labyrinth of case material on the
issue,' 3 yet many facets of the problem have not been passed upon
judicially.
In its narrowest sense the problem presented in Council v.
Commonwealth is: What constitutes sufficient evidence for entrance
of a nunc pro tunc order? The prior rule in Virginia was that the
evidence had to be in the record per se, nothing short of this was
sufficient. The court itself cited five previous Virginia cases' 4 which
voice the earlier rule:
[Courts can make] amendments in their records only in
cases in which they can be safely made, and that amend-
ments cannot be made upon the individual recollection of
the judge, or upon proof aliunde. [Emphasis added.]' 5
Apparently Virginia formerly held the strictest view of any minority
state in that no evidence outside the record itself was sufficient.
The same result could have been reached in the instant case by
the use of the more liberal minority rule,'" but the court elected'7
to make a clean sweep and take a definitive stand with the majority
group.
In passing it might be noted that the editorial staff of Amer-
ican Jurisprudence discuss the major possibilities of the various
13 In 10 A.L.R. at 526 the editors state: In compiling and discussing the
cases concerned with correcting clerical errors in judgments the range
is so wide, the distinctions so fine, and the conflict of opinion so great,
that one cannot afford to ignore or omit aught found upon the subject,
however slight in value, which illuminates and exemplifies the actions
of the courts in rectifying such mistakes.
14 Burch v. White, 3 Rand (24 Va.) 104 (1824); Commonwealth v. Cawood,
2 Va.Cas. (4 Va.) 527 (1826); Powell v. Commonwealth, 11 Gratt.
(52 Va.) 822 (1854); Barnes v. Commonwealth, 92 Va. 794, 23 S.E.
784 (1895); Teasley v. Commonwealth, 188 Va. 376, 49 S.E.2d 604
(1948).
'5 Barnes v. Commonwealth, supra at 800, 23 S.E. 784 at 786.
:16 The more liberal minority rule permits use of "quasi record proofs".
17 The Attorney General asked that the court adopt the more liberal minor-
ity rule and no more.
views on the admission or non-admission of evidence extrinsic to the
record,'" but they do not categorize the views into the limited
classification used by the Virginia court. The Virginia court did
not indicate the sources of its classification. It is interesting to note
that Freeman feels that the "minority view" is the weight of
authority.' 9 However, he classifies the issue as one of the "greatest
importance and difficulty" in the total field of decrees nunc pro
tunC.
20
The dissenting judges21 in Council v. Commonwealth felt that
the majority were opening the door for possible fraud and misuse,
and that what was "certain and definite" under the former rule
would be of nebulous force in the future.22
It is the writer's opinion that Virginia has not abandoned her
philosophy concerning nunc pro tunc judgments expressed in the
numerous pre-1956 cases, but merely shifted the emphasis of the
evidence rule involved in such judgments. While the case is not as
sensational upon a careful analysis as it seems upon first reading,
(being one of degree only), nevertheless the door has been opened
for a flood of litigation upon the sufficiency of evidence in a type of
case which has had no new litigation upon that point in Virginia for
over 130 years. It would seem that in a case of the type colloquially
ascribed as one in which "hard facts make poor law" the court saw
fit to discard historical trappings for what they considered a more
realistic twentieth century approach founded on "common sense"
reasoning. It is respectfully submitted, however, that by so doing
the courts discarded a rule which would fit all cases for a freer
rule necessitating re-evaluation in every new factual presentation.
The origin of orders nuc pro tunc was to further the cause of
actual justice. Paradoxically it would seem that the rule expounded
in Council v. Commonwealth fulfills and advances this historic pur-
pose while at the same time it expresses a retrogression to uncer-
tainty of application.
J. L. D.
18 30 Am.Jur. at 882.
29 Freeman, op. cit. supra, at 235.
20 Id. at 242.
21 Justices Buchanan and Miller.
22 Council v. Commonwealth, supra, at 295, 94 S.E. 2d at 251.
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